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Abstract
China continues to invest in natural resources in Africa to fuel its economic growth.
China’s expanded presence in Africa has contributed to growing tensions within the SinoAfrican relationship. This thesis examines a variety of historical factors that have
contributed to the increased presence of China in Africa, and how these factors have
evolved into the foundations of the tensions observed today.
By exploring the historical patterns of the Sino-Zambian relationship, this thesis will shed
light on the foundations of the underlying tensions between the two countries. With the
Zambian election of 2006 as a focal point, China faced a political crisis that threatened
their broader economic future. Using a double-pronged economic and political approach
to mitigate the crisis, China avoided losing its interests in the 2006 Zambian election. But
in the long run, China has continued facing the same anti-Chinese sentiments in Zambia
which questions the viability of their political risk management strategy.
This thesis argues that for China to mitigate a political crisis in another African country
most effectively, they must modify their strategic decision making model for managing
political risk. This thesis proposes an alternate framework which would most effectively
address underlying tensions between China and Africa.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Overview and summary of China’s broader involvement in Africa
The Chinese economic revolution over the past three decades has been one of the
most intriguing storylines in recent economic history. From 1979 until 2010, China’s Gross
Domestic Product(GDP) growth has averaged 9.91%, the highest growth rate amongst
developing countries.1 Despite some of the fundamental weaknesses present in the
economy because of state control, the Chinese have nonetheless still achieved an
impressive growth rate. The prosperity of China’s economy has led to China not only
becoming an economic power in the world, but also supplanting itself as a global political
power.2 In the international conflicts in which it is involved, the Chinese have not wavered
to international diplomatic pressure, perhaps because of their powerful global economic
position. For example, it shows no signs of retreat in the battle over the Senkaku Islands,
and the Japanese now threaten to arm themselves with nuclear weapons due to the United
States’ lack of ability to dissuade or negotiate with China.3 Additionally, North Korea
continues conducting nuclear weapons tests with no reprimand from China, the North
Korean’s chief ally. The brazen Chinese Communist Party(CCP) has been emboldened by
China’s growing status in the world. 4
While the CCP as a party has somewhat evolved to accommodate the digital
realities of the 21st century, but they are still very much an authoritarian regime that aims

1

“China Strategy: Refining yours could open new doors,” PWC Growing your Business 63, (2011):4.
Ben Carter, “Is China’s economy really the largest in the world?” BBC News, December 16, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30483762.
3
Shantanu Roy-Chadhury, “The Senkaku Islands Dispute,” International Policy Digest, August 01, 2016,
https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/08/01/senkaku-islands-dispute/.
4
Richard S. Williamson, “A Rising, Emboldened China,” Mediterranean Quarterly 22, no. 1 (2011): 15.
2
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to repress thought not conducive to one-party, CCP total control of China. China’s political
system of a one party authoritarian state has been a major factor in its ability to rapidly
expand economically. State-owned enterprises (SOEs), which will be explored more
deeply later in the paper, are the main economic, quasi-political tool which the CCP uses
to engage in foreign countries.
In addition to their own domestic economic growth, China’s economy has
expanded to include Africa as an important economic and political ally and resource. As
China has continued growing, they have increased their demand for cheap metals and
natural resources which they can import for domestic use to build factories and
infrastructure. Africa, rich in natural resources, has provided the perfect market for China
with ideal domestic economic and political factors in many countries.
Economically, Africa provides plentiful quantities of the many natural resources
that China needs for its own domestic infrastructural development and economic growth.
There are many African countries on the other hand with questionable human rights
practices and thus make them toxic destinations for western aid. China has exploited
Africa’s tumultuous relationship with the west and the Chinese have positioned themselves
as the less stringent and less intrusive alternative to traditional western aid.
The Chinese are currently not only positioning themselves economically in Africa,
they are also positioning themselves in terms of international politics. In 2015, President
Xi Jinping pledged $100 million to the African Union Standby force and an additional $1
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billion dollars to the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund.5 This marks a drastic change
in previous standard operating procedure for the CCP where they were reluctant to
participate in global institutions and global politics. Driven partly by economic interests
and international political perception, the Chinese are slowly changing the way they do
business in Africa to reflect this change. This includes some acknowledgement of human
rights violations along with weak efforts at combating carbon pollution and climate change.
It is also important to note China’s current domestic economic situation as a
possible influence on their economic decisions. Unless drastic measures are taken, China
could soon be facing a dire debt and housing crisis that could damage the global financial
system.6 With the CCP’s reluctance to acknowledge and responsibly deal with the debt
crisis, the CCP must explore additional revenue and resource streams to fund its own
deficits. This could perhaps factor implicitly or explicitly in China’s engagement strategy
in Africa.
The integration of the Chinese economy with various African countries has yielded
many benefits for the Chinese as well as many problems. This paper will explore the
sources of tension in the Sino-African relationship and how the Chinese have dealt with
these tensions. The tensions of the Sino-African relationship can be most accurately
epitomized by the relationship between Zambia and China Given Zambia’s political,
economic, and natural resource profile, it holds many similarities with other African
countries where China is also investing. The explosion of the Chinese owned Chambishi

5

Courtney J. Fung, “China’s Troop Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping,” United States Institute of Peace,
July 26, 2016, http://www.usip.org/publications/2016/07/26/china-s-troop-contributions-un-peacekeeping.
6
Ben Carter, “Is China’s economy really the largest in the world?” BBC News, December 16, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30483762.
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mine in 2006 triggered the outward manifestation of the subtle tension already underlying
the Sino-Zambian relationship. The CCP’s response to this crisis yields insight into
Chinese foreign micro-political engagement and may yield some insights into CCP foreign
policy strategy in Africa in the future.
Historical Examination of Sino-African Relations (Pre-1995)
With a long-lasting relationship going back to the Ming Dynasty, the Sino-African
connection has evolved from one based on politics to one based on economics. It is
important to understand the historical context of this relationship to understand both China
and Africa’s current goals in cultivating the relationship. With the formation of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, a more formal, consistent, and substantive
Sino-African relationship began, starting with the formal establishment of diplomatic ties
with Egypt in 1956.7 Since that point, China has continued establishing a long-lasting
bilateral relationship with Africa. Indeed, fifty-one of fifty-four African Countries share
diplomatic ties with China. Additionally, the Chinese foreign minister’s first trip is always
to an African country.8 Both the Chinese and various African countries have contributed
to cultivating this relationship, which demonstrates their willingness to help each other
succeed. Researcher Zhang Chun says, “China-Africa relations also contribute to both
sides’ struggle for a higher international status.”9 Meaning they both observe and would

7

“China-Egypt Relations.” Chinese Foreign Ministry. January 18, 2004.
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/phfnt/85089.htm.
8
“Spotlight: Chinese FM's visit to Africa attests to strong China-Africa ties.” Xinhua. February, 2, 2007.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-02/07/c_135083654.htm.
9
Zhang Chun, "The Sino-Africa Relationship: Toward a New Strategic Partnership," Emerging Powers in
Africa (2013): 10.
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like to maintain the relationship because of the geopolitical implications. This willingness
to work each other has yielded a large amount of economic activity between China and
Africa. Between 1950 and 2013 trade between China and Africa increased from $12million
to over $170 billion.

10 11

Additionally, the number of individual countries with over $1

billion in trade to China reached 20 in 2008.12
Given the multiple opportunities for Sino-African partnerships to flourish, it has
only really been since the turn of the millennium in which Sino-African relations have been
considered globally consequential economically, politically, and geopolitically. A 2015
RAND Corporation report articulates, “The explosive growth in Sino-African relations
over the past decade has heightened trepidation about China’s role in Africa. Of the more
than 5 million Chinese citizens living overseas, approximately 1 million live in Africa, up
from only a few thousand ten years ago.”13 The number of Chinese nationals living in
Africa demonstrates the increased involvement and scale of Sino-African relations over
time.
As previously mentioned, Chinese engagement in Africa is not new, but it has
significantly changed in form over time. Historically driven by a need to export Maoism
and the Chinese brand of communism, Beijing drastically changed its engagement strategy
in Africa following the market oriented reforms of Deng Xiaoping. Before Deng Xiaoping,

10

ibid, 11
Miria Pigato & Wenxia Tang, “China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an Evolving Global
Context,” Investing in Africa Forum (2015):33.
12
Zhang Chun, "The Sino-Africa Relationship: Toward a New Strategic Partnership," Emerging Powers in
Africa (2013): 11.
13
Lloyd Thrall, China’s Expanding African Relations: Implications for U.S. National Security (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 1.
11
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Chinese doctrine toward Africa hinged on “third-world solidarity” along with support of
African liberation movements.14 The Chinese diplomatic engagement framework in Africa
hinged on portraying Africa as a battle between socialism and colonialism. 15 During the
Cold War, the Chinese were not only battling west for ideological influence of the third
world, but they were also battling the Soviet Union from spreading their brand of
communism. In Somalia, the Chinese supported the Leninist Somalis in the SomaliaEthiopian War while the Russians supported Stalinist Ethiopia.16 In Zimbabwe, Beijing
supported, and continues to support, Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union
Party, while opposing western-backed governments and Soviet-backed rebels.17 The
RAND report points out, “Beijing’s active involvement in African politics and support for
sub state liberation movements, while decidedly limited in scope compared with U.S. and
Soviet activity, demonstrates the limits of Beijing’s theoretically apolitical approach to
Africa.”18 Despite the apolitical approach Beijing claims to take in Africa, they still manage
to influence and manipulate foreign political situations to their advantage. This highlights
the importance of a viable political management strategy by the CCP for future situations.
As part of its effort to codify this sentiment of non-interference, China and India
devised the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” in 1954. The five principles were;
The mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and

14

ibid, 4.
ibid.
16
ibid.
17
ibid, 5.
18
ibid, 6
15
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cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.19 Originally, this plan was solely
an agreement between China and India, then adopted one year later at the Asian-African
Bandung Conference as an implicit contract of non-interference between China and Africa.
The agreement strongly emphasized self-determination for developing countries. This
agreement dictated Chinese behavior in African politics until the 2006 Zambian election,
when it finally had to interfere, but this situation will be discussed in more detail in later
chapters.
Owing no small part to African support, China was able to gain entry into the United
Nations in 1940. Carefully coaxing and luring, China established a common thread of antiimperialist sentiment with many African countries which prompted many African countries
to ally with China. A report articulates Mao’ strategy in Africa, “In 1959, Mao Zedong
referred to Africa as a partner in the ‘struggle against imperialism.”20 Carefully trying to
garner a similarity in the struggle against imperialism became a crucial tool as China
influenced the newly independent African states into recognizing China over Taiwan.
Many African countries continued recognizing Taiwan, but as China continued its lobbying
efforts, the number of countries continued to increase. In fact, as of 2014, there are only 3
African countries left that recognize Taiwan. [See Figure 1] In 1963 Chinese Premier Zhou
Enlai visited eleven African countries attempting to frame China’s position in the region

19

“United Nations: Treaty Series.” United Nations 299, no. 4307 (1958):57.
Lloyd Thrall, China’s Expanding African Relations: Implications for U.S. National Security (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 63.
20
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as an ally in anti-colonialism, while committing the PRC to nearly $120 million loans and
other development projects.21
FIGURE 1

Source:

http://www.geocurrents.info/wp-

content/uploads/2012/08/Africa-Recognition-of-Taiwan-Map.jpg

Diplomatically, China has also increased and cultivated its relationships in Africa
with many countries. Beginning in the Cold War, China supported many of the freedom
and anti-western movements that many African countries were going through at the time.
Russia crossed alliances and supported Ethiopia in a dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia,
this drove Siad Barre to form an alliance with the Chinese and he broke away from the
Russian Brand of communism. Additionally, the United Nations has been an arena in which
Sino-African relations can be seen flourishing. In 1971, many African countries supported

21

Deborah Bruatigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009), 32.
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China in its quest of recognition in the UN. As a document from a Chinese embassy in
Egypt proclaims, “China resumed its legal status in the United Nations largely due to
support from the developing world, including many African countries.” The document
adds, “Also thanks to the long-time adherence to the one- China principle by those
countries, the attempt by Taiwan- an island province of China separated from the mainland
after a civil war in the 1940s- to join the United Nations have ended in failure 13 times
since the 1990s.”22
As market reforms were implemented and the Cold War ended, China’s economic
interests evolved and its policy toward Africa changed accordingly. In the 1970s and 1980s,
China was a net oil exporter, but in 1993, it officially became a net oil importer.23 China’s
consumption of copper and other natural resources has also steadily increased. In 1995,
Chinese consumption of aluminum, copper, and oil increased exponentially and has
continued increasing since.24 Thus, it is no coincidence that this is when the new phase of
the Sino-African relationship started to develop.

22

Chang Ailing, “From "brothers" to "partners": China, Africa building strategic ties,” Embassy of the
People’s Republic of China in the Arab Republic of Egypt, September 29, 2016, http://eg.chinaembassy.org/eng/zagx/t274327.htm.
23
Luft, Gal. “Fueling the dragon: China's race into the oil market.” Institute for the Analysis of Global
Security. 2003. http://www.iags.org/china.htm.
24
David Menzie et. Al. “China’s Growing Appetite for Minerals. “US Geological Survey. 2004.
https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2004/1374/2004-1374.pdf.
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FIGURE 2

Source: Thomas
White International (http://www.thomaswhite.com/images/explore-world-new/bric-spotlight/brazil-iron-steel-02.JPG)

Modern Chinese Relations with Africa (1995-present)
The second, and current phase of the Sino-African relationship can be classified as
a mostly economic relationship. As China’s consumption of natural resources has
increased, they have turned to countries in Africa as reliable trading partners. With their
membership into the WTO in 2001, China officially had access to the world market. As
The Economist reports, “The bet paid off for China. It has blossomed into the world’s
greatest exporter and second-biggest importer. The marriage of foreign know-how,
Chinese labour and the open global market has succeeded beyond anyone’s
predictions.”25This increased trade was a major factor of China’s expanded economic

25

“Shades of Grey,” The Economist, December 10, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21541408.
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presence in Africa. Approximately a quarter of sub-Saharan Africa’s trade in 2013 came
from China, up from 2.3 percent in 1985.26 As a World Bank report articulates, “About
one-third of China’s energy imports come from sub-Saharan Africa-a vital trade link,
especially as energy and commodity consumption rates in China have grown by more than
twice the global average over the past 10 years.”27 [See Figure 2]
China’s increasing economic demands as the Chinese economy flourished
necessarily changed the relationship between China and Africa to rely on economic
necessity for both. As a RAND report articulates, “Chinese economic interests, however,
have gradually subsumed Beijing’s previous ideological and political interests as drivers
of Chinese Behavior in Africa. Beginning with the fallout from the Great Leap Forward
and Cultural Revolution, continuing with the closing of the Cold War, and accelerating
alongside China’s economic development, China’s political interests in Africa have waned
relative to growing economic ties.”28 The report further notes, “The ascendancy of China’s
economic interests is reflected in a stream of economic and political events over the past
three decades: China becoming an oil importer in 1993; Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
reorganization and packaging of aid, trade and investment to Africa in the mid-1990s;
admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001; and roughly an order of
magnitude expansion of economic ties over the past ten years.”29 Moreover, white papers

26

Miria Pigato & Wenxia Tang, “China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an Evolving Global
Context,” Investing in Africa Forum (2015):1.
27
ibid.
28
Lloyd Thrall, China’s Expanding African Relations: Implications for U.S. National Security (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 6.
29
ibid,6.
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produced by the CCP in 2006, 2010, and 2013 summarize the economic necessity of
investing in Africa.
Additionally, as trade between China and Africa has increased, so has Foreign
Direct Investment by China in Africa. Starting out at almost nothing, China had $3.1 billion
in FDI in Africa in 2013, representing 7 percent of global FDI flows in specifically subSaharan Africa.30 Due to various government policies and other market drivers, the 1990s
marked a big jump in Chinese FDI in Africa. The second large increase came during the
global recession of 2008. When the global recession occurred, many firms left Africa, but
Chinese state-owned enterprises, with the backing of the CCP, could not only sustain their
presence in Africa, but they could increase their presence in many areas through mergers
and acquisitions, debt financing, and other arrangements. Additionally, a World Bank
report found that despite China’s decreasing economic growth rate, China’s trade with subSaharan Africa has continued increasing and has reached a total value of $170 billion as of
2013.31
Overseas investments by the Chinese government has been a huge driver of growth
for the Chinese. Along with an expanding manufacturing sector, the expanding Chinese
middle class has led to a bigger consumption of energy for the Chinese which has led to an
increase in mining for foreign resources. Indeed, Chinese overseas investments and
construction projects total over $1.3 Trillion. Additionally, China is projected to become a

30

Miria Pigato & Wenxia Tang, “China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an Evolving Global
Context,” Investing in Africa Forum (2015):3.
31
Miria Pigato & Wenxia Tang, “China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an Evolving Global
Context,” Investing in Africa Forum (2015):2,
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net exporter of capital by the year 2020.32 In Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa specifically,
China has invested approximately $250 billion in infrastructure projects and other
investments, outpacing loans from the International Monetary Fund and other Western
partners.33 While China does have capital invested in a number of different sectors across
sub-Saharan Africa, some of the biggest recipients of Chinese funds are the energy and oil
sector, mining sectors, and other natural resource mining projects. Consisting of mainly
natural resource mining, China has been blamed for a new form of colonialism which
contributed to the eventual crisis it faced in 2006. While China’s investment strategy may
resemble old colonial tactics, evidence suggests that China is using its investments
primarily to gain political influence in other countries to improve its economic outcome.
Overall Africa has benefitted greatly from trade with the Chinese. The World Bank
Report articulates, “Exporters in SSA[sub-Saharan Africa] have faced very little
competition from Chinese exports in third markets, as many of SSA’s export products are
unrelated, or even complementary, to Chinese products in key markets such as the
European Union and the United States.”34
Diplomatically, China has continued cultivating its relationships with African
countries. Their diplomatic relationships reflect the economic nature of the current SinoAfrican relationship. For example, the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

32

Jamil Anderlini, “China to become one of world’s biggest overseas investors by 2020,” Financial Times,
June 25, 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/5136953a-1b3d-11e5-8201-cbdb03d71480.
33
Stefano Pozzebon, “China has crossed a major investment threshold that is going to change the entire
world,” Business Insider, February 04, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/statistics-on-chinasinvestment-abroad-2015-2.
34
Miria Pigato & Wenxia Tang, “China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an Evolving Global
Context,” Investing in Africa Forum (2015):2.
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(FOCAC) has served as the main political tool with which China conducts its business in
Africa. In 2000, the first Ministerial meeting was held in Beijing from October 10th-12th.35
The FOCAC was formed with the intention of cultivating consultation and dialogue
between the China and Africa. As Ian Taylor articulates, “The existence of FOCAC might
be best seen as the institutionalization of Sino-African relations at a time of intensified
interactions and following a period of exponential growth in such linkages.”36 He adds, “It
is also the formalization of relationships which have been long in existence and which can
trace their origins back 50 years.”37 The FOCAC meeting focuses on dialogue surrounding
the economic and diplomatic framework underlying the Sino-African relationship. The
conversations had during the FOCAC are usually followed up by action items which each
country should accomplish. Many times, the progress is not measured and the action items
are not accomplished. In fact, only China, South Africa, and Ethiopia have institutional
mechanisms for measuring FOCAC progress.38Despite the lack of accountability, China
has legitimized FOCAC by gaining a reputation for sticking to its commitments.39
Although implementation of projects is sometimes slow, China makes a noticeable effort
to implement projects which helps its standing in the eyes of the African community. The
FOCAC serves as an important tool moving forward in Sino-African relations. The

35

“The 1st Ministerial Conference,” Sina Corporation, October 26, 2006,
http://english.sina.com/p/1/2006/1026/92709.html.
36
Ian Taylor, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (New York: Routledge, 2011), 1.
37
ibid.
38
39
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diplomatic relationship has also worked in the reverse, to the benefit of African countries.
For example, Nigeria has relied on China in its quest for a permanent UN seat.40
Among the many facets of the Sino-African relationship, there are some underlying
tensions which will be discussed in more depth in later chapters. The fundamentals of this
tension are based on accusations that China is engaging in a new type of colonialism where
they are taking advantage of developing African nations by mining resources and not
investing in the local community. Indeed, as the Sino-African relationship has evolved,
China has grown to be Africa’s main export market accounting for 20 percent of imports
in Sub-Saharan Africa. While there is a slight trade imbalance, what worries critics is the
domination of commodities and raw materials as a percentage of trade. As of 2014,
Commodities, crude materials, and other raw materials accounted for 85 percent of the
value of Chinese imports from Africa. As China’s economy has expanded and the demand
for consumer goods has increased, China has increased demand for things like oil, copper,
and other mineral fuels. The African continent is full of untapped resources of natural
goods and China hopes to capitalize on that. Many have argued that this is not simply a
business or new market entry opportunity for China, it is exploitation reminiscent of old
colonialism by the Europeans.41 This argument emphasizes the exploitative aspect of the
Sino-African relationship. It is important to note that exploitative aspects do exists. Some
of these include the willingness to allow human rights abuses to continue without

40

Okumu Wafula. “Africa and the UN Security Council Permanent Seats.” Pambazuka News. April 28,
2005. http://www.pambazuka.org/governance/africa-and-un-security-council-permanent-seats.
41
Sautman, Barry & Yan Hairong. ““Chinese Neo-Colonialism in Africa”: a Bien-Pensant Political Ploy.”
China Policy Institute Analysis. December 17, 2015. https://cpianalysis.org/2015/12/17/chinese-neocolonialism-in-africa-a-bien-pensant-political-ploy/.
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repercussion for countries in which they are active.42 Moreover, China has also been
charged with its own human rights abuses both in mainland China and in projects it
conducts abroad.43 China’s lack of concern for Humans Rights Abuse is a very strategic
position for two reasons. For geopolitical reasons, the strategy allows the Chinese to offer
“no-strings-attached” aid to countries where it is active, or would like to be active in the
future. This is in stark contrast to Western aid which often comes with caveats or political
promises.44 Many African countries have residual anti-western sentiments from
colonialism. 45 The Chinese option often provides the better alternative for them as opposed
to western countries. This has posed a dilemma for western countries, such as the US, who
used to have leverage in Africa, but with Chinese economic presence now rivaling that of
traditional Western Powers in Africa many African countries are turning away from the
West and positioning themselves, not only economically, but also politically with China.
46

China’s lack of concern about Human rights is also important economically.
China’s own rapid growth story has been predicated by cheap wages, poor working
conditions, and lack of environmental concern. Based on their actions in Africa, they
believe this same model of growth can help African countries also succeed. As Madison
Condon states, “China believes that its successful ‘growth at any cost’ strategy at home
can be applied in Africa, and is not shy about it.”47 This strategy is also appealing to African

42

Madison Condon, “China in Africa: What the Policy of Nonintervention Adds to the Western
Development Dilemma,” The Fletcher Journal of Human Security 27, (2012):11.
43
ibid.
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ibid, 12.
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countries because in addition to anti-western sentiments, many do not believe climate
change agreements should include them because they are still developing. They believe
that because the West could pollute, they should also be able to pollute, and this argument
meshes well with China’s overall investment strategy and hence provides the basis for a
natural partnership.
How the evolution of the CCP has affected Chinese engagement in Africa
Despite China’s economic and increasing energy needs, Chinese engagement in
Africa has also been the result of an internal evolution within the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). As demonstrated during the Great Leap Forward, many of China’s economic
problems have taken a backseat to promoting the Communist ideology of the CCP. It is
worth noting a few important facts about the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP is the
founding party of the People’s Republic of China the (PRC). The Chinese Revolution in
1949 led to the CCP as the single ruling party in China- a system that remains in place
today.
The CCP during the Mao Era was a very tragic but important part of China’s
history. During the Mao Era, many Chinese lost their lives due to the Great Leap Forward
and the Cultural Revolution. Despite the great loss of life, Mao’s actions during these two
events enshrined a power, respect, and fear of the CCP that frames much of China’s public
policy today. Mao Zedong’s communist vision aimed for collectivist ownership of the
economy. Thus, his first goal was state-ownership of all land and goods, so that it may be
redistributed evenly. Mainly focused on economic and political control, Mao wanted to
increase China’s self-reliance. His method of economic development resulted in rapid

21

industrial growth at first but then eventually made China’s technology fall decades behind
the rest of the world.48
Two divisions can characterize China’s ideas on economic development; Mao and
the Gang of Four who prioritized the strength of the CCP over economic strength versus
Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai who preferred the strategy of “reform and opening.” Dr.
Andrew Nathan articulates, “Reform meant changes in the domestic economic and
administrative systems, especially freeing the peasants from the communes so they could
farm as families or engage in local industry, and freeing industrial enterprises to compete
in a market environment. Opening meant joining the global economy, allowing foreign
trade and investment to flourish.”49As Deng Xiaoping famously stated “Poverty is not
socialism” and “to be rich is glorious.”
This turn in internal CCP politics allowed China to expand its international
presence by opening it up to outside markets. Additionally, this economic reform
moderated many of the political stances of the CCOP. While great repression and
suppression continued to be present in China, the number of political deaths fell.50 In the
three decades following Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, exponential economic and social
progress occurred, as compared to the three decades of the Mao Era. The CCP’s internal

48

Andrew J. Nathan “China's Foreign Policy: The Historical Legacy and the Current Challenge,” Columbia
University: Asia for Educators, 2009,
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_foreign_policy.htm.
49
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evolution has resulted in a China that is more internationally engaged and socially
moderate.
In terms of investment in Africa, the Chinese have ridden the wave of increased
trade into Africa. As previously mentioned, the CCP has a close working relationship with
many African countries-something that would not have been viable in the age of Mao.
This paper so far, has examined the historical perspectives of the Sino-African
relationship and its evolution into its current form. As China transitioned from the Maoist
era into its current quasi-capitalist form, it has opened itself up economically which has not
only resulted in impressive economic gains for China, but has benefitted many African
countries as well. While the relationship has been mostly mutually beneficial, there is an
underlying tension in the Sino-African Relationship that comes from the colonial legacy of
many African countries. Both Western countries and African countries themselves are
concerned about the possible exploitation of resources within this relationship between
Africa and the Chinese. While this paper will not focus on that aspect of the relationship,
the case study of Zambia does provide a lot of insight into the dynamic of the Sino-African
relationship in many other African countries and will thus be explored in more depth.
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Chapter II: Chinese Involvement in Zambia
History of CCP decision to invest in Africa
Chinese economic activity in Africa has been focused on the extraction of natural
resources in order to fuel China’s own domestic economic growth. As such, it is no
coincidence that China’s strongest relationships in Africa are with countries that are
abundant in natural resources. Indeed, a leaked US diplomatic cable noted that, “If oil or
gas is found in Kenya, China’s engagement with that country would likely grow.” 51 The
country that will be the focus of this paper is Zambia. Despite the many economic
advantages both Zambia and China enjoy from Chinese investment, due to certain social
and political pressures, China has recently had to mitigate the effects of anti-Chinese
sentiment in national elections. Prior to the relatively recent development, the Chinese
government and Chinese investors enjoyed a cordial relationship between the Zambian
government and its people. This chapter will explore the economic and political history of
specifically the Sino-Zambian relationship and the evolution of that relationship over time.
Additionally, this chapter will also contain an analysis of the Zambian government’s
decision making when choosing to ally with China.
Chinese-Zambia relations extend back to the 1960s with the creation of a railway line
between Zambia and Tanzania, also known as the Tazara Railway. As discussed in the last
chapter, at this moment in history China was seeking support in the third world against the
west and the Soviet Union. The Tazara Railway was a tool they would use to garner this
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support. The project was intended to, “break Zambian dependence on white-ruled Southern
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South Africa, and Angola in exporting its copper.”52 Per
independent surveys conducted by private agencies, the World Bank, and the United
Nations, the project was declared economically unfeasible and impractical. Tanzania’s
President Julius Nyerere approached China with a request to finance the railroad in 1965.
He met with Chinese Chairman Mao, President Liu Shaoqi, and Premier Zhou Enlai.53 The
meeting resulted in a promise by China to help with the railroad building. President Liu
Shaoqi said, “if the railway is important to you and Zambia, we will build it for you.”54 Per
some Chinese reports, the internal decision was made prior to the formal request made by
President Nyerere. Premier Zhou Enlai consulted with the Ministry of Railways to
determine the feasibility of the project, then approached Chairman Mao and encouraged
him to accept the request. He said, “in order to help the newly independent African
countries and support their national liberation effort, if President Nyerere raised the railway
financing request, I would suggest we agree.”55 The Tazara railway is important in
examining China’s intent in investing Zambia. An examination of economic conditions
between Zambia, Tanzania, and China shows that not only was China not in economic
condition to be providing an interest free loan, but on a per capita basis, they were poorer
than Zambia, one of the countries they were trying to help. China’s income per capita in
1980 was $250 whereas Zambia’s per capita income was at $680. This project resulted in
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a different model of development dubbed “collaboration of the poor.”56 But more
importantly, this project demonstrated the politically driven decision to initially invest in
Zambia. Researchers Monga and Lin point out “China was using development assistance
in Africa to achieve strategic goals, largely diplomatic at the time.”57 Despite the largely
diplomatic focus of China’s aid at the time, it resulted in increased standing and positive
perception within African countries and allowed them to reap the economic benefits of the
relationship. Additionally, as Monga and Lin point out, “Funded at the cost of US $400
million through a long term interest-free loan, when Western countries and agencies had
declared it economically unfeasible, and built with Chinese technical expertise with
African capacity building as the major goal, the Tazara Railway gave China political and
moral capital in Africa that has not yet dissipated.”58 Based on the Tazara Railway project,
Chinese investment in Africa can be classified as an example of the primarily political
interest of China’s early investment strategy in Zambia.
The Chinese relationship with Zambia has, in the past two decades, evolved from a
political relationship to an economic partnership. As the Chinese economy grew in the
1990s and the economy generated a large demand for raw materials, China saw
opportunities to capitalize on its political relationships with African countries rich in
natural resources.59 In Zambia, China continued to build on the relationship it had
cultivated with Zambia in the early 1970s with the construction of the Tarzara railway.
Zambia’s first President, Kenneth Kaunda developed a close relationship with Beijing. In
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1973, China granted Zambia $10 million to assist Zambia with transport issues due to the
closure of its border with Rhodesia.60 In 1974, President Kaunda visited China again, this
time receiving a $20 million loan.61 In addition to China offering scholarships to Zambian
children and sending trained medical teams to Zambia, by the end of the decade China had
invested $230 million in Zambia with the next closest investor, the Soviet Union, having
put in a little over $15 million.62 In the 1980s, Zambia agreed to closer military cooperation
with Chinese troops following another visit to China by President Kaunda in 1980. This
visited also yielded “soft power” agreements relating to sports, culture, media, and health.63
Zambia’s President Kaunda returned to China one last time in 1988 before losing to
Frederick Chiluba in the 1991 Zambian election. Following Kaunda’s loss, China
continued relations with new government. Cultural ties became deeper between the two
countries. For example, in 1992 China sent teachers to the University of Zambia.
Additionally, the city of Luzhou in the Sichuan province of China established a sister city
link with Kabwe, a city in Zambia. The Presidential visits continued with President Chiluba
visiting Beijing in 1993 and 2000. The Zambian vice-president, Godfrey Miyanda also
visited Beijing in 1995, and the Zambian defense minister Miles Sampa visited in 1998.64
In terms of Chinese diplomatic visits, China’s Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji visited Lusaka in
1995 and Premier Li Peng visited in 1997. Additionally, in order to facilitate the large
amount of Chinese activity in Zambia, the Bank of China opened a branch in Zambia in
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1997- the first Chinese bank in sub-Saharan Africa. The high-level nature of the meetings
between the two countries highlights the importance of the relationship between them. This
led to yet another growth in the relationship between the two countries by way of the
Chambishi Mine. These examples can serve as examples of the increasingly economic
nature of the Sino-Zambian relationship.
Perhaps the most salient point of the evolving nature of the Chinese and Zambian
partnership was the acquisition by the Chinese of the Chambishi Mine. In 1998, the
Chambishi Copper Mine in Zambia was obtained by the China Nonferrous Metal Mining
Company (CNMC). This marked China’s second significant foray into the Zambian
economy after the Tarzara Railway Project. The 85 percent stake of the Chambishi Mine
was purchased at $20 million, with an additional $130 million invested in refurbishing the
mine and making it cleaner.65 It is worth noting that following the opening of the mine,
Zambia’s exports to China rose seventeen-fold between 2002 and 2006.66 The purchase of
the mine is demonstrative of the evolved relationship between China and Zambia. In prior
decades, China and Zambia had formed a “collaboration of the poor,” to create the Tazara
Railway. The increased demand for copper was the direct reason behind the investment
into the mine. This increase in demand for copper is representative of broader Chinese
economic trends. Ching Kwan Lee articulates, “Today, Chinese state-owned mining
companies sell copper in the international market for profit. But as a senior NFCA manager
foresaw, ‘one day if there was an embargo, then Chinese companies would of course sell
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only to China.’ The circumstances in which the Chinese acquired the Chambishi mine, one
of the least profitable, were illustrative of this distinctive logic.”67 A senior CNMC official
at the time of the purchase details the decision making by the CCP when they decided to
but the Chambishi mine. He says:
We bought the mine for $20 million, which is peanuts to the Chinese government
today, but back then it required the signatures of all nine members of the Standing
Committee of the Politburo. We got Chambishi, which even the Zambians did not
want. It had been closed for almost thirteen years. When we arrived, the
underground tunnels had collapsed and all the machines had been moved to other
mines, except the de-watering devices. But we still found it attractive because what
is considered low grade [2.1 per cent] internationally is already higher than what
we have in China [1 per cent], so we thought there should be room for some profit.68
This anonymous official also outlines that Taiwan was a reason that China became invested
in the bidding process. Under President Kaunda, Zambia engagement was minimal with
Taiwan, if none at some points. In the new government, President Chiluba continued this
policy, but he soon began to thaw relations with Taiwan, eventually inviting them to the
bidding on the mine. The source adds, “our participation in the privatization process was
influenced by this factor of competition with Taiwan.”69 Additionally, still impressed upon
the Chinese was the impact of African countries on Chinese affairs with the unseating of
Taiwan in the United Nations in favor of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Another

67

Lee, Ching Kwan. “The Spectre of Global China.” New Left Review 89, (2014):37.
ibid.
69
ibid.
68

29

manager adds, “The big boss of our company is the Chinese state. In this day and age,
diplomacy and investment, politics and economics are intertwined. In the eyes of the state,
our meagre corporate profits don’t count as much as its interest in diplomacy and foreign
relations.”70
As observed from the analysis of the historical patterns of Chinese investment in
Zambia, it is evident the CCP uses a variety economic and political tools to ensure a
beneficial outcome. Presented more structurally, these tools are SOES, bilateral trade
agreements, loans, and increased FDI.
Economic Tools
State-Owned Enterprises are companies owned by the Chinese government. These
companies often act as proxies for the Chinese government in the foreign arena.
Specifically, to Zambia, it was the Chinese non-ferrous metals mining company (CNMC)
that bought the Chambishi Mine. Apart from the mine, SOEs also run the infrastructure
projects that China conducts in Zambia as well as in other African countries. When SOEs
conduct infrastructure projects, they are also mandated to invest in the surrounding
communities, but they rarely do this due to the nature of natural resource extraction
processes. When implementing a project to extract natural resources, the project is very
capital intensive and does not require much labor. This means that when China starts a new
project, they can use workers from the SOE and do not have to hire a lot of local
contractors. This does not provide for very good communal relations and can be a
contributor to later tensions. Serving as proxy actors for the CCP, SOEs can serve to
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increase China’s soft power within Zambia as well as internationally, by improving its
perception.
Another economic tool the CCP uses for influence in Zambia are bilateral trade
agreements. Bilateral trade volume between the two countries reached $83 million in 2002,
a substantial amount of money for both countries. With such a large volume of money
being exchanged between the two economies, it is mutually beneficial for both countries
to continue the relationship on good terms.
In addition to trade agreements and SOEs, China also uses interest free loans to increase
its political capital. Throughout China’s relationship with Zambia, an interest free loan has
been part of many financing agreements, and additionally, a part of China’s condition free
loan policy. As part of this policy, China does not attach conditions to the loans like many
western countries do. They loan the money, and want repayment per the quantitative
demands of the loan, with no qualitative requirements. This poses a quagmire for western
economies who on one hand bemoan the rise of China in Africa, but on the other hand
would not offer such attractive loans to the African countries where China tolerates
corruption and human rights abuses. This demonstrates just how powerful a tool the loan
is for China.
Political Tools
The political relationship between the two countries is also very close. President
Kaunda described the relationship like this, “The Chinese investments in Zambia today are
different than the investment of the 1960s and 70s-today there is a lot of economic interest
(…) [but] I believe that, even today the history of political friendship between Zambia and
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China plays a very important role for Chinese investments in Zambia.”71 China has been
able to capitalize on this political friendship with the creation of institutions beneficial to
Chinese investment activities. The Chinese government openly supported the Zambian
ruling party, “both financially and rhetorically.”72 This connection provides Chinese
investors with quick and direct access to the highest levels of Zambia’s government.
Additionally, the Chinese government receives support from the Zambian government.
Bastholm and Krageland note that there are specifically four organizations that have been
“set up at the request of the Chinese state to support the Chinese investors in their day-day
to day activities.”73 These organization are: the Chinese embassy, the Association of
Chinese corporations in Zambia (ACCZ), the China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade (CCIPT), and the Zambian branch of the Bank of China (BOC).
The Chinese embassy acts as a liaison between Chinese investors and Zambian
government officials. Additionally, the embassy, as a direct link to the Chinese
government, often acts on behalf of the CCP in investment negotiations, which makes it a
very important part of the Zambian investment landscape.74 ACZT was founded in 2005
and will be discussed in more detail as part of the Chinese response to the Chambishi Mine
explosion. The CCIPT acts as a tool for Chinese investors to help them find suitable
opportunities. The researchers Bastholm and Krageland adds, “The primary function of
CCIPT is to identify suitable investment options, provide practical support (in the form of
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accommodation, transport and communication), and facilitate contacts with relevant
Zambian authorities for potential or newly arrived Chinese investors.”75
The result of the economic and political closeness between the Zambians and the
Chinese has been the overall increase in FDI by China into Zambia. For example in 1991,
Chinese OFDI was 4 percent and in 2001, it increased to 16 percent. As China has increased
their presence in Zambia, they have quadrupled their direct investment in the country. Per
a 2014 Bank of Zambia Foreign Direct Investment report, investment in mining accounted
for 65.5% of all investments.76 Additionally, because China is the world’s largest consumer
of copper.
It is important to note that these economic tools are tools that China used before the
2006 Chambishi Mine explosion. Following the explosion, China could no longer rely on
economic results to retain goodwill, thus creating a hybrid approach of engagement which
will be discussed later in the paper.
Overview of Zambian Decision to invest with China
While the paper has outlined many economic and political reasons China has been so
aggressive in Zambia, it is important to point out that Zambia also has its own reasons for
wanting to collaborate with China.
Politically, by aligning itself with China, Zambia has an ally on the world stage. In
terms of its own domestic politics, before the 2005 explosion, Zambian politics were
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generally friendly to China, thus it was beneficial for the ruling party to befriend and
continue the Chinese relationship. Economically, Zambia has an export market in China
due to a variety of bilateral trade agreements which is a boost to the Zambian economy.
Additionally, Zambia’s expanding economy is making it a bigger player in African
continental politics and positioning.
Zambia is a small country with a small economy, but ironically it is one of the most
resource rich countries in Africa, lying on the southern edge of the Copperbelt. Beginning
with the initial investment by China into the Tazara Railway, one sees that this relationship
began as the result of Zambia’s lack of resources to fund its own railway. Additionally,
under President Kaunda, the Zambian economy was undergoing a process called
“Zambianization,” a process where the state would acquire a controlling stake in many
mines and field of land to protect from colonialization.77

In this period, the global

economy experienced a slump in copper prices which in turn bruised the Kaunda
government’s cash flow. This forced a reliance on International Monetary Fund (IMF)
bailouts, and a moment of emergency one party rule with austerity measures. Austerity was
generally unpopular but more specifically with trade unions. This led to Frederick
Chibula’s victory in 1991, he was the head of the construction workers’ trade union. 78 It
was in this decade that Zambia struck many deals with China, and other countries and
private corporation. Through the privatization process, Zambia regained economic success
while reducing its reliance on the global copper market. As Lee says, “While tax revenue
from copper had accounted for 59 percent of government income in the 1960s, by the early
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2000s it brought in an astonishingly anemic 5 per cent, due to the extraordinarily investor
friendly development agreements signed with foreign companies after mines were
privatized.”79
Additionally, Zambia, like many other developing economies, lacks the capability to
construct large scale projects or efficiently operate the natural resource that many of them
have.80 Indeed Mthuli Ncube, chief economist of the African Development Bank (ADB)
notes that Africa has very weak manufacturing and agro-processing sectors. He says,
“exploiting natural resources is capital intensive and does not create many jobs directly.”81
As such, it makes economic sense for a larger superpower who has the industrial capability
to conduct many of these projects. Because China not only has this capability, but in
addition to the other tools mentioned, SOEs, loans, and trade agreements, Zambia is very
willing to enter a partnership with China.
As mentioned, the Zambian decision to collaborate economically with China is due to
the many financial benefits just shown that a Chinese-Zambian partnership brings to
Zambia. Despite the many financial benefits, there are also political considerations that
have recently started to play a bigger role in the relationship. Beginning with the Chambishi
mine explosion of 2005, the rest of this paper will examine the political and economic
ramifications of the explosion, how China dealt with the increasingly hostile political
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situation in Zambia, and how China’s strategy for this crisis management can be applied to
other countries where it faces similar political pressures.
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Chapter III: 2006 Chambishi Mine Explosion
Overview of the Circumstances leading to the mine explosion
The 1998 acquisition of the Chambishi Mine was crucial to supporting Chinese
expansion interests and sustaining their economic growth. Going overseas to obtain copper
was the strategy in place, and remains their strategy today.82
After years of heavy expansion and investment in Zambian mines and infrastructure,
the Chinese government and Chinese investment have experienced some social and
political resistance. On April 20 of 2005, an explosives factory, BGRIMM Explosives,
located on the premises of the Chambishi Mine and owned by the Chinese Non-ferrous
metal mining company (NFCA) exploded. With an initial death toll of 46, final estimates
counted 52 people.83 While the mine itself was not affected by the explosion, Zambian
nationals accounted for all 52 deaths which sparked an uproar. Social tensions caused by
frustration with mine safety were exposed with the social unrest that occurred after the
mine explosion. Carola McGiffert adds, “Chinese mining companies were accused of
ignoring safety regulations and limiting trade union activities.”84 In addition to these two
issues, the deaths of the Zambians began a national political conversation over the presence
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of the Chinese in Zambia. As previously mentioned, before the explosion of the mine, there
were certain social and economic pressures that had accumulated in the society.
The poor quality of Chinese infrastructure products is an example of the issue of poor
production quality is an issue that is present in discussion of Chinese companies today, but
it is has been a problem that has plagued the Chinese since China increased mining and
infrastructure projects. In Africa, many infrastructure projects which the Chinese produce
are deemed poor quality or do not perform well in the long term. 85 In Zambia the Chinese
continue this trend by building poorly constructed roads that do not last for very long. There
are many reasons that the Chinese investment seems to be so shoddily executed. Chilufya
Chileshe argues that a weak regulatory setting encourages the shoddy work from the
Chinese. Chileshe says, “The Chinese take full advantage of the weaknesses such as poor
quality control, labor protection or land allocation, in countries like Zambia, and export
their bad practices alongside their investments.”86The Transparency Bribe Payers Index
found that Chinese companies are some of the most willing to give bribes, which brings
into question the legitimacy of many the contracts Chinese SOEs receive in Zambia. 87 The
low market entry price is not a great incentive for China to produce high quality products
and could be a contributor to their consistently poor production quality. Additionally, the
low market entry price could very much be a contributor to the labor abuses that China is
notorious for as well. Indeed, there were complaints with the CNMC about the Chambishi
Mine when it had just began operating under Chinese management. “Staff at Mines Safety
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Department revealed that early in the life of the mine, they proposed to suspend operations
at the mine on safety grounds,” the SARPN reports.88
At the time of the Chambishi mine explosion, the mine was understaffed with
underpaid workers. Indeed, many labor protests had been held before the mine explosion
even occurred. A SAPRN report details CNMC HR practices, “Chambishi Mines pays the
lowest wages of all the mining companies, and employs a tiny share of its workforce on
permanent pensionable contracts.”89 “The company has attempted to impose on these
workers its extremely unpopular, ‘scientific encouragement scheme,’ whereby half of a
worker’s salary is delivered in a fixed amount and another chunk ‘floats’ according to
management’s assessment of the performance of the company overall, the worker’s
division, and the individual,” the report adds. Additionally, the CNMC is the only mining
company in Zambia that denies all dependents of full-time worker’s healthcare.90 This
means that many of the workers are now paying more for healthcare for their dependents.
Privatization also affected the local townships where the mines were located. In many
of the towns around the mines, the residents survive solely on subsistence agriculture.
Privatization, with the loose regulatory structure of Zambia discussed earlier, allowed
mining companies to own the mine and surrounding land areas. The low wages of many
mine workers have increased farming activity which has led to some people farming on
mine land, meaning they can be kicked off the land at any time.91 The lack of job security
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and low wages has led to some unforeseen consequences. The SARPN reports, “As a result
of the overwhelming poverty of the Chambishi area, the company’s draft Environmental
Impact Assessment reports that, “All the clinics in Chambishi Township have reported an
increase in nutritional defects and incidents of preventable diseases, including sexually
transmitted infections since privatization. This has been attributed to the increasing poverty
levels in the township, one consequence of which has been an increase in prostitution.”92
So in addition to the increased healthcare costs, people are getting sicker which contributed
to the overall unhappiness of the Chambishi township.
Political rumblings were also present in the time leading to the mine explosion. The
loose regulatory structure in Zambia has allowed for some dealings that could be classified
collusion at best and corruption at worst.93 Chinese SOES have developed and maintained
a close relationship with the Zambian government for not only business reasons, but also
in the effort to maintain the good nature of the political relationship between the two
countries. The relationship which has yielded some harms for local Zambian townships,
as detailed above, is bemoaned by some of the residents. The SARPN reports, “One of the
major concerns about NFCA expressed by local people, in bars and on buses across the
Copperbelt, is the idea that the company is able to operate with impunity because of the
closeness of its relationship, or at least the Chinese state’s relationship, with the Zambian
Government.”94 The Zambian government has publicly discussed some of the safety
violations that many mining companies commit, but not going as far as a rebuke. In fact,
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the Zambian Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mines subtly referred to the CNMC
in terms of some of the safety violations that had occurred. He said:
“We have very good rapport with mining companies. They are very understanding.
We work with them, and there is an excellent relationship. But there are one or two
who tend to step outside the normal and we notice that we call them and talk to
them. I won't mention this one particular company. The Head of State has called
them and talked to them. And we believe that a new chapter has been created - the
problems that people were seeing will be a thing of the past.”95
The political hostility fueled the aftermath of the mine explosion. The actions and reactions
by the Zambians and Chinese will be discussed in the next chapter. But the built-up political
hostility and eventual spillover proved to be the biggest fuel for the fire of the political
crisis following the mine explosion.
More broadly speaking, antipathy towards the Chinese has been a wave present in many
African countries. In Kenya, Nigeria, Namibia, and many other countries where there is a
large Chinese presence, local populations have become disenchanted with Chinese projects
and investment. The local sentiment in Zambia has been no different. With the promise of
increased investment in the country to lead to a decrease in poverty, but with no difference
in many poverty factors like HDI, GDP Per capita, and other factors, coupled with some
local disasters, local sentiment has slowly turned against the Chinese. Indeed, the issue of
Chinese investment has evolved into a deep political issue.

95

ibid.

41

As discussed, there were many different factors that were present before the actual
explosion of the mine. A combination of these factors led to the large political crisis that
China encountered in the aftermath of the explosion. While there were physical mine safety
concerns, as reported, many Zambians were used to the shoddy production techniques that
the SOEs used. One could attribute much of the crisis to build up social anxieties and
frustration that spilled over into the political arena. As such, it is important to note that this
observation of increased social pressures is an important factor in the Chinese mitigation
strategy post-explosion. Reducing social pressures can include many steps and strategies
that will be discussed in the section of the paper detailing the crux of the Chinese response.
Zambian Reaction to the explosion
After the 2005 mine explosion, many Zambians reacted very negatively to the
explosions, especially due to the loss of mostly Zambian lives. This part of the paper will
analyze the Zambian social reaction and political reaction to the Chinese. Also included in
this analysis will be an examination of how anti-Chinese sentiment changed over time.
This change will be measure in terms of public opinion polls and election polls.
i.

Protests

The social reaction to the mine explosion was indeed very negative. Carola
McGiffert says, “In Zambia, public protest greeted President Hu Jintao on his arrival in
Lusaka in 2006.”96 As demonstrated by the protests of President Hu Jintao, the concern
that had been underlying the expansion of Chinese economic activity, boiled over into a
96
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full-blown outrage. The protests, fueled by social pressures, eventually translated into the
political arena. While the political pressure is eventually what China has to directly respond
to, social pressures in Zambia, or any other political system, tend to influence the political
outcome. So as part of its crisis management strategy in Zambia, China needs to address
the social issues that privatization has caused, as detailed above.
ii.

Economic Threats

The explosion of the mine also led to the organization of workers and formation of
unions-which posed a grave economic threat to Chinese companies. Deborah Brautigam
points out, “the BGRIMM explosion also helped facilitate Zambia’s National Union of
Miners and Allied Workers’ efforts to organize workers at the Chinese mine.”97 The longtime abuses and built-up social anxiety over the presence of the Chinese built up and led
to workers unionizing. While the unions themselves turned out not to be very effective in
isolation, they contributed to the overall anti-Chinese sentiment. It is no mistake that the
most vocal head bearer of anti-Chinese sentiment was Michael Sata, a former union boss.
He was able to best understand and channel the frustration many Zambians felt against the
Chinese. Thus, the formation of unions became another form of resistance against the
Chinese
iii.

Political Threats

Much of the reaction to the mine explosion was in social protests which eventually
spilled over into the political arena. Given China’s relationship with the Zambian
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government, political ramifications as a results of the mine explosion would be very
devastating to Chinese. As observed by the above analysis on segmented Zambian reaction
to the mine explosion, the mine explosion was devastating to the Chinese on a number of
fronts. Despite the tragedy of the explosion, the Chinese did not expect the sheer volume
of anti-Chinese sentiment, and surely did not expect the 2006 election to be a referendum
on the Chinese presence in Zambia. The Zambian election happening in the following year
aided in the political steam that the issue picked up. “The incident was picked up by
opposition leader Michael Sata and turned into the focal point of his presidential campaign
in which he accused the Chinese of destroying their country.”98 As detailed in the next
chapter, the 2006 Zambian election suddenly went from being the transition of power
within Zambia’s domestic politics as usual, to a political crisis for China. Despite China’s
strategy to successfully remain as a powerful influence and presence in Zambia, the legacy
of the 2006 Zambian election remains. Indeed, the unsuccessful challenger in 2006,
Michael Sata, won election in 2011 while still capitalizing on anti-Chinese sentimentalthough not as strongly as 2006.99
iv.

2006 Zambian Election

This social anxiety over the Chinese presence spilled over into the 2006 Presidential
campaign. Historically, the Movement for Multi-Party democracy(MMD) had been the
ruling and dominant party, and a friend of Chinese investment. As the party in power when
heavy Chinese economic and financial investment in the country begun, the CCP was close
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to the MMD and vice versa. Thus when the mine explosion happened, public sentiment
turned against the MMD and incumbent President Levy Mwanawasa and posed a serious
threat to Chinese investments. Patriotic Front party leader Michael Sata became the leading
voice propelling anti-Chinese sentiment. While Incumbent President Mwanawasa did end
up winning the election, Michael Sata, at one point in the campaign, gained a significant
advantage according to some polls.100 Even though Sata ended up losing, he forced China
to become involved in Zambian domestic politics, a reversal of their longstanding policy
against direct intervention in foreign politics. To understand what the components of
Chinese intervention was, this chapter will explore the 2006 election in detail to understand
what the exact threats the CCP faced.
In Zambia after the mine explosion, Michael Sata’s anti-Chinese rhetoric was
strong and effective. He was a proponent of slowing down and even decreasing the amount
China could invest. In addition, he added that he would recognize Taiwan if he won.
Michael Sata posed a political and economic threat to China’s business interests. A month
before the election, some polls showed him leading incumbent Mwanawasa. A Michael
Sata win would have been devastating for China both in Zambia and in other countries.
The Chinese deployed a political tool as the first step to mitigate the effects of
Michael Sata’s rhetoric. The Chinese ambassador to Zambia Li Baodong threatened to cut
diplomatic ties between China and Zambia in the event of a Sata victory. “Chinese
investors in mining, construction and tourism have put on hold further investments in
Zambia until the uncertainty surrounding our bilateral relations with Zambia is cleared,”
100
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Mr. Li said.101 His statement was important because it marked one of the first overt attempts
in decades at political manipulation by China in an African country it was involved in.102
Mr. Baodong’s statement made two weeks before the election resulted in a turning point in
the election.103Indeed a pre-election poll conducted by the Steadman group and released
on September 2, 2006 gave Mwanawasa a comfortable nine point lead over Sata, but trends
sowed Sata rapidly gaining support.104 On September 9, 2006, Pangolin Consulting, a firm
started by a political science professor at UNZA, Neo Simutanyi, showed Mr. Mwanawasa
polling at a little over 50 percent while Mr. Sata dropped to 19% Following Mr. Baoding’s
statement and overall consolidation efforts by Mr. Mwanawasa, the incumbent widened
his margin victory on election day to 43 percent of the vote compared to Sata’s 27
percent.105 The dramatic Chinese threat to cut off diplomatic relations with Zambia showed
the gravity of what was at stake for China. China’s largest source of copper and other rare
natural resources was at risk, and for Zambia, their biggest source of foreign direct
investment was at risk of disappearing. While many people did eventually vote for Mr.
Mwanawasa, Michael Sata gained and retained support in areas most affected by Chinese
presence; this was mainly the Copperbelt area. While there was a coalition big enough to
support Mr. Mwanawasa’s path to victory, Mr. Sata’s coalition was not insignificant. In
fact, in the national assembly, Mr. Sata’s party, the Patriotic Front, gained 42 seats
compared to the MMDs negligible pickup of 3 seats. For China to be successful in this
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political climate, it would still have to devise a political strategy that would appease the
anti-Chinese sentiment of the Patriotic Front Party. All of this internal political sparring
was not good for the Chinese. The Chinese had been advantaged by the economic and
political cooperation of one party over a long period of time, with no real resistance. Taylor
et al. add, “The emergence of the Patriotic Front (PF) led by Michael Sata (known as ‘King
Cobra’), and public support for this party, can be seen as one of the most substantial new
developments in Zambian internal politics since 1991.”106
Chinese FDI has developed into a huge presence and source of capital for many
developing African countries. Research suggests that in the industries which the Chinese
consider strategic, the Chinese SOEs operate with a political end in mind rather than an
economic end. Ian Taylor notes that due to the nature of Chinese SOEs, they are not
constrained by profit targets and shareholders, in the appropriate setting, these companies
are arms of the Chinese Political party. Amongst other contributions such as increasing its
contribution to UN Peacekeeping forces, greater involvement in peaceful conflict
resolution in Africa, and the regular visits Chinese leaders make on the continent, China
aims to use all these tools to project the image of a China that is peacefully developing and
is a responsibly rising power. This paper will examine whether it has been able to do this
using the Zambian case study.107
The Role of SOEs in Chinese investment
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As previously mentioned, Chinese SOEs play an integral role in China’s foreign
engagement. In Chinese politics SOEs are used as Chinese tools for investment and as ways
for the Chinese communist party to retain control over the economy. The Chinese political
system remains centrally planned because of the government’s ability to retain control over
information and the economy, which brings in the role of SOEs domestically. They act as
corporate agents for the Chinese government in terms of implementing various projects,
controlling the amount of capital. And other things. In terms of foreign engagement, SOEs
also play a crucial role. According to Bates Gill, “China’s SOEs implement Beijing’s aid
projects, extract strategic natural resources for export back to China or for profit in the
international marketplace, and expand their manufacturing bases in China.”108 In other
words Chinese SOEs are the tools that the government uses to invest in Africa, and by
extension as diplomatic tools. SOEs are useful for several reasons, the main reason being
cheap labor. Chinese SOEs in Africa are primarily engaged in infrastructure and natural
resource projects which require large amounts of human capital and labor. Because of
funding provided by the Chinese government along with labor laws in China, many SOEs
can provide the lowest cost expert and manual labor for these projects.109 In 2006, there
were approximately 74,000 Chinese workers in Africa working on Chinse projects on a
temporary basis110

Despite the low-cost labor being provided, Chinese firms are

encountering problems both domestically and abroad. Due to the nature of Chinese control
of SOEs, there are many different government agencies with competing interests which is
presenting a problem in terms of performance for many of the Chinese SOEs. In terms of
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foreign engagement, many SOEs are attracting negative press in many countries. Due to
the competitive nature of SOEs many try to undercut each other in terms of price and
efficiency, but in turn sacrifice safety and quality of work. This has led to some accidents
which have gained the ire of many African locals. No other example is this more evident
than in the 2005 mine explosion in Zambia which led to anti-Chinese sentiment becoming
the foundation and cornerstone of Michael Sata’s campaign.
In terms of domestic problems, SOEs are controlled by many different government
agencies. Starting at the national level, the State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC) is the main stakeholder, if not the sole stakeholder,
in all Chinese SOEs. Bates Gill points out, “Because most of China’s large SOEs are now
listed either on the Chinese or international stock market, the SASAC is constrained by
that market. If the SOE’s stock goes down, the SASAC has the most to lose as the largest
shareholder.”111 As such, the SOE has the most incentive to make sure Chinese SOEs are
performing well by maximizing value.
As detailed previously, Zambian social unrest after the explosion put a lot of
pressure on the Zambian government, as well as the Chinese government. Because of the
anti-Chinese rhetoric spewed by Mr. Sata in the 2006 election, Chinese business interests
were put at risk based on the strained relationship between the Zambian government and
Chinese enterprises.
The Zambian political system is in the framework of a presidential representative
democratic republic. Within this system there are five main political parties. These parties
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are: The Alliance for Democracy and Development (ADD), the Forum for Democracy and
Development (FDD), the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) Patriotic Front
(PF), and the United Party for National Development (UNDP).112 These political parties
played a role in the contracts that allowed the Chinese to enter the Zambian markets,
oftentimes being able to skirt the rules and regulations other companies were subjected to.
The DFEC is responsible for regulating all Chinese companies involved overseas.
The DFEC also has the authority to fine or revoke the permission to operate overseas for
corporations that do not adhere to Chinese government and regulations while they are
overseas- this means the DFEC is responsible for the treatment of China’s overseas workers
by Chinese corporations.113
Apart from the EX-IM bank, The DFA is the main arm that the CCP uses to
administer China’s aid projects. The DFA administers and takes responsibility for safety
and quality of China’s construction in their aid projects.
In addition to the MOC there are also other agencies that have some control and interest in
SOE performance. Another such agency is the Ministry of foreign affairs (MOFA). The
MOFA coordinates trips to Africa by Chinese Diplomats, ensuring that they are doing the
right thing. In addition, the MOFA oversees all Chinese embassies and consulates in
Africa.
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The Chinese state-owned Ex-Im bank is the monetary tool the CCP uses to disburse
aid and other funds to African countries. The bank is able to provide low-rate loans directly
to African governments, but in addition, the bank is able to provide various credits and low
rate loans to Chinese SOEs. Through various coordination schemes, the EX-IM bank can
work with the MOC to allow various Chinese SOEs to bid on different projects. The
preferential rates also allow the Chinese SOEs to be more competitive when bidding on
different projects. For example Huawei the Chinese communications technology company
received a $10 billion dollar loan at a low rate. This allowed Huawei to win contracts worth
more than $400 million to provide cell service in Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe.114
One of the main problems that have been a result of having multiple stakeholders
is the principle-agent problem. This problem has resulted in suboptimal performance by
SOEs which have undermined China’s overall goal of portraying themselves as a
peacefully growing power.
The principle-agent problem occurs when two parties have differing interests and
asymmetric information, with the agent having more information. The principle cannot be
certain that the agent is a citing in the best interest of the principle. The principle can then
choose not to enter a transaction that would have been beneficial for both the principle and
agent, thereby causing agency costs. In terms of Chinese SOEs in Africa, agency costs are
caused by Chinese government officials who are not confident that the SOEs will act in
their best interests and so do not approve them for any projects or contracts. Indeed,
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conflicting agencies cause the delineation of objectives. Bates Gill says, “The ‘China Inc.’
model may be far less monolithic than outside observers assume”115
Significance of explosion on Mine interests
Opposition by local groups in Zambia, and other African countries in general, to
Chinese presence is caused by a couple of things. One, is that Chinese firms are rarely
familiar with local customs, laws, or institutions and secondly, the dominance of Chinese
firms in Africa generate fears of Chinese dominance on the continent.116 In order for China
to becoming more tasteful to local Africans in their respective regions, they have to deal
with these two fears.
Following the successful results of the 2006 election, China made efforts to improve and
refine its political intervention strategy. They did this in part to not seem as blatantly
intrusive in the political process of another country, but also because long term prospects
for China rely heavily on the mining of different metals and materials, an objective that is
nearly impossible without the cooperation of resource rich African countries like Zambia.
In 2007, President Hu-Jintao visited Zambia as part of an eight-country tour where he
offered loan funds, and promise of increased investment.117
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Chapter IV: CCP Reaction to Zambian Political unrest
Introduction
A combination of the Zambian social unrest and political activism by Michael Sata
resulted in a very toxic economic and political situation for China in Zambia. This
environment forced China’s hand in intervening in Zambia’s domestic politics. As Ian
Taylor so acutely states, “In terms of Chinese involvement in African internal affairs, these
elections set a precedent that has been termed the ‘loss of China’s political virginity in
Africa.’”118 This chapter will propose a framework that the Chinese government perhaps
acted within, and then will examine CCP actions in Zambia within the context of this
framework.
CCP Framework for micropolitical engagement
The CCP’s foray into internal African politics was a dramatic reversal of its policy of
non-intervention. The initial calculation on whether CCP should intervene in internal
politics was based on a cost-benefit analysis which yielded that the benefit of intervention
would not exceed the costs. Researcher Madison Condon states, “Mutual economic benefit
is the main priority of Chinese involvement in Africa, even if this means ignoring
corruption and human rights abuses resulting from the cash flows.”119 However, after the
Chambishi Mine explosion, the political and economic calculus morphed into a situation
in which the benefits of intervention outweighed the costs. The in-depth analysis conducted
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in previous chapters has examined the historical relationship between China and Zambia
and how that relationship has evolved over time. Prior to the Chambishi Mine explosion,
analysis shows that the benefits of non-intervention did indeed outweigh the costs of
intervention for China. But as demonstrated by the analysis of the 2006 election, the costs
of non-intervention very rapidly increased and exceeded the benefits, thereby forcing
China’s hand. While China’s election intervention was successful in the short term by
aiding in incumbent Levy Mwanawasa’s victory, in the long-run, the results have not been
as successful. This section of the paper will introduce a framework by which China should
have conducted their political intervention when they finally did intervene based on the
political risks they faced in 2006.
Survey of different CCP mechanisms used to intervene in the election
In dealing with overall anti-Chinese sentiment and specifically with Michael Sata
in the 2006 election, the CCP deployed several mechanisms to counter the anti-Chinese
sentiment and attempt to influence the election. Kopinski says, “The usage of anti-Chinese
rhetoric in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the real threat that politicians like Sata might one day
take power in Zambia, forced Beijing to adopt a new political line.”120 The new political
line introduced by the Chinese was accompanied by different mechanisms that Beijing
deployed to try and shift public opinion.
The most salient CCP mechanism used was the deployment of Li Baodong, the
Chinese ambassador after Mr. Sata threatened to recognize Taiwan. As previously stated,
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Mr. Baodong threatened the end of the Chinese-Zambian relationship if Zambia recognized
Taiwan. Li Baodong’s statement clearly stated a punishment for a certain political
outcome. Ian Taylor adds, “Li Baodong’s statement was a clear violation of the idea of the
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.”121
Shortly after the election in 2007, President Hu Jintao visited Zambia for three
days- a significant amount of time relative to other visits. “The length of the visit was seen
as confirmation of China’s interest in deepening relations with Zambia,” Taylor adds.
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Additionally, the Chinese offered another economic incentive, the Multi-Facility
Economic Zone(MFEZ). According to the Zambian Ministry of Commerce, MFEZs are
supposed to make Zambia more economically competitive. They say, “The implementation
of MFEZs in Zambia is designed to make Zambia competitive through increased activity
in the trade and manufacturing sectors, which have numerous positive spillover effects in
other sectors such as utilities, transport, agriculture and services.”123These special zones
being created are in the best interest of Zambia, and thus are an incentive for Zambia to
maintain the relationship with China.
It is clear that China’s methods for dealing with the crisis have been a “carrot and stick
method.” They made threats of discontinuing the long-standing relationship between the
two countries, while simultaneously offering numerous economic incentives for Zambia to
continue the relationship in good faith.
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Did CCP achieve intended objectives?
After an examination of the problem the CCP encountered of containing anti-Chinese
sentiment in Zambia after the mine explosion and the CCP’s strategy of dealing with the
crisis, the question remains of whether Beijing achieved its goals by intervening in the
election. The answer to this question is two-fold.
On one hand, Michael Sata did lose the election, keeping the party most friendly to the
Chinese, the MMD, in power. The defeat of Mr. Sata, the chief spokesman for anti-Chinese
sentiment, was a major victory for the Chinese. The threat of Mr. Sata was indeed so
dangerous that Beijing broke its own rule of not intervening in foreign political affairs.
However, in order to gauge the true success of Beijing’s victory, one must also examine
other factors. One alarming factor was the large loss of MMD seats in parliament and the
Patriotic Front’s large gain. This is indicative of the fact that while maybe the Chinese were
able to influence the presidential election, they had not managed to influence the grassroots
anti-Chinese sentiment. Indeed, in 2011 Mr. Sata ran for office again with slightly
moderated anti-Chinese rhetoric, and was elected. His election shows that anti-Chinese
sentiment still runs very deep in Zambia. Presuming the intent to invest long-term in
Zambia, it is evident that China did not achieve their goal of managing anti-Chinese
sentiment. If Michael Sata is an indication of anti-Chinese sentiment in Zambia, then China
was able to apply a bandage to the situation before it wore off. Given Michael Sata’s
resurgence, the strategy to manage the political crisis of 2006 was a failure.
Additionally, Ian Taylor points out the intangible nature of anti-Chinese sentiment in
Zambia. He says, “The experience of the 2006 election campaign created an immaterial
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structure of Chinese perception on the African continent.”124 Meaning there was previously
a material structure to the way the Chinese were perceived in terms of their extraction of
natural resources and economic investment. The 2006 election spurred the underlying
social and intangible resentment of the Chinese that had built up over the many years of
Chinese investment.
Based on a comparison of the short and long term political results of Chinese
intervention, one could see that their intervention was successful in the short term, but
lacked effectiveness in the long term. It is important to note that there are some factors
which could have contributed to the success or lack of success of Chinese intervention. For
example, Zambian anti-Chinese sentiment could simply have reflected a broader trend of
Zambia’s overall exacerbation with foreign companies. Despite broader trends that may
have been present, the evidence shows that negative sentiment was mainly associated with
Chinese investment and Chinese companies.
Proposed Framework
The mine explosion caused palpable distress to both the Zambians and the Chinese. For
the Zambians, frustration with lack of safety standards by Chinese companies, along with
cultural displacement. The Chinese were at risk of losing the supply for copper, a major
input to their economy. The reaction from the Zambian mine was filled with bitterness and
vitriol towards the Chinese by Zambian workers. As detailed in the last chapter, this
bitterness and anger translated into the political process. As a result, Chinese investment
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faced a grim future if Michael Sata won. In an effort to mitigate the consequences of the
explosion and not allow anti-Chinese candidate Michael Sata to take power, Beijing
deployed a number of political and economic crisis management tools. Given an analysis
of the problems China faced in the short term and long term this chapter will propose a
decision-making strategy which the CCP should have followed to mitigate the political
crisis most effectively it faced in China.
China faced a three-pronged problem in Zambia; economic, social, and political. Yet,
the CCP chose to attack only the economic and political problem, thereby neglecting
strategy to deal with negative social attitudes. by offering the special economic zones as
incentives, and they attacked the political problem by deploying Mr. Lia Baodong to
threaten an end to the Sino-Zambian relationship. Alon et al. point out, “policy risk and
economic risk have all been communicated using the generically broad term of ‘political
risk.”125 In other words, when dealing with the 2006 Zambian election, China addressed
only the “political risk.” The concept for the model proposed in this paper to outline
Chinese decision making has its basis in VK Narayanan and Liam Fahey’s decision making
model introduced in “The Micro-Politics of Strategy Formulation.”126 The model outlined
in their paper outlines two stages of decision making, gestation and resolution, and then
they further subdivide them into five parts: Activation, mobilization, coalescence,
encounter, and decision.
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Activation- is the stage in which individuals become aware of an issue that affects
them. The authors note, “The activation phase is complete when individuals have
developed a sufficient level of clarity and ‘language’ about their concerns to be able
to articulate the issues in an intelligible way to other organizational
members.”127(28).
Mobilization- is the stage in which an issue if mobilized begins to gain traction
amongst many individuals which eventually translates into organizational action.
The authors say, “The mobilization stage entails the elevation of issue awareness
from the individual to the organizational level.”128
Coalescence- is the stage in which alliances of individuals begin to occur. Each of
these alliances is based on some sort of common proposed solution to the problem
that has been introduced. The authors note that within an organization, alliances
can often be between different hierarchies of power which can lead to asymmetries
which slow down the decision-making process. It is also important to note that this
step is the last step in the ‘gestation’ part of the model.
Encounter- is the stage within the model where the organization must encounter the
problem. Coalitions must be appeased within the organization. The authors say,
“As the coalition begins to sponsor its preferred strategic alternative(s), decision
making enters a stage in which the coalition must interact with other organizational
entities…”129This is also the first stage within the ‘resolution’ part of the model.
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Decision- The decision stage is when all coalitions must be considered, costs and
benefits weighed, and a decision must be made on how to solve the problem. The
authors note that the decision may come in the form of commitment to a future
action, postponement of decision to a future date, not deciding altogether, or noting
that the initial problem is indicative of a larger problem that also needs to be
addressed.130
This model by Narayanan and Fahey provides a strong framework for the examination of
the Chinese- Zambia relationship after the 2006 Chambishi Mine explosion. Each stage of
the model accurately correspond with an examination of what action was executed by the
CCP in China to alleviate the problem.
Due to the nature of the political and social risk the Chinese faced, the next chapter
of will propose some alterations to this decision-making model which would most
adequately fit China’s ideal decision making model in the future.
In using this model, it is important to identify and define two things. First, all stages
of decision-making within this model are based on the decision making to solve a problem
within an organization. Given the structure of the CCP and its relationship with SOEs, this
paper will utilize SOEs as proxies for the CCP when possible. Additionally, it is important
to note that the problem that the SOEs had to solve in Zambia was the possibility of antiChinese Michael Sata winning the 2006 election. These two things define the paradigm of
alternate proposed framework in the next chapter.
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Chapter V: Future CCP Micropolitical engagement
The conceptual model proposed in the last chapter, will be analyzed in this chapter
specifically in the context of China and Zambia. Additionally, the model will be analyzed
in terms of forecasting future Chinese political interventions in other African countries.
There are many African countries in which anti-Chinese sentiment is also very large. As
demonstrated by the economic analysis of Chinese investment, Chinese investment has
grown and continues to grow throughout Africa in the form of FDI, mining, and
infrastructure projects.

As the method of Chinese investment is relatively standard

throughout Africa- the focus on harvesting minerals and natural resources- there are certain
to be tensions like those found in Zambia. This chapter will examine other locations in
Africa where China might face challenges like those found in Zambia. The model for
Chinese intervention in Zambia seemed to have only been partially successful and so this
section of the paper will also propose ways in which China can improve on the model of
engagement used in Zambia. The new proposed strategy will allow China not only to
improve its strategy, but the strategy will then be a scalable usable strategy which they can
use across many other African Countries.
The CCP model of political intervention was virtually non-existent prior to the 2006
Zambian election. Thus, the basis of the decision-making model used to intervene in the
2006 election is mainly reactionary as opposed to proactive. This is embodied in the CCP
decision to address economic and political pressures, but failing to address social unrest
over Chinese investment. However, this does not mean the model completely lacks utility
in scalability and ability to be implemented in a similar situation. With a few alterations,
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this model could become a consistently useful tool for Chinese political intervention in
other countries in which crises like the one in Zambia may arise. The alterations to the
initial theoretical model proposed in this paper would make the model specifically
applicable to China, and more proactive instead of reactive. This would entail three steps.
Making the first step of the model anticipation, adding an additional mobilization segment
to the resolution part of the model, and adding a decision-making accountability step as the
last part of the model.
According to the theoretical model outlined in the last chapter, the first step is
activation. The step in which awareness of a problem arises on the individual level. While
it is important to identify the problem when it arises, a model that would be more beneficial
for China would make the alternate proposed first step of “anticipation.” This step would
entail conducting social and political analyses to determine the probability of a massive
protest or uprising that would disrupt investment. In other words, anticipation of disrupting
forces such as these would help in identifying potential problems before they turn into
dramatic events. For example, in Zambia, before the 2006 mine explosion, there was
evidence of anti-Chinese sentiment already. Ian Taylor points out, “Public Resentment
towards China was present before the 2006 election, and in the Copperbelt it was mainly
connected to issues of safety standards in Chinese-owned mine…”131 Ironically if the
Chinese had paid attention to the overall negative sentiment toward their lack of regard for
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safety in mines, the Chambishi Mine explosion could have been avoided because they
would have increased worker and mine safety to prevent the explosion.
Also, included in the original conceptual model, there is a mobilization segment. In
this segment, individuals start to mobilize into like-minded groups so that they can act as
agent against the problem. This is part of the gestation level of the model. Similarly, I
would like to add another mobilization step in the resolution phase. As important as
reaching the right strategic decision maybe, it is also just as important to mobilize a
coalition that can advocate for the decision. In the Zambia crisis, China was not able to
perform this step due to the reactionary nature of their response. As a result, the Chinese
reaction resulted in a temporary result which ended in Michael Sata winning in 2011- albeit
on much more moderate terms. The utilization of mobilization groups would have helped
spread the economic benefits and incentives of collaborating with the Chinese. This would
help social attitudes and perhaps dissolve some of the underlying tension in the relationship
between Chinese SOEs and the Zambian people.
The third step to making this model more applicable for specifically for the CCP
and for scalability is the addition of an internal decision-making accountability segment as
the last step of the model. After a decision has been reached using the other methods of the
model, it is imperative that two things be accomplished: verification that the decision was
not reached under the influence of collusion, or external pressure, and secondly, make sure
that the decision is actually carried out and accomplished. The addition of the last step
could help aid in the alleviation of tensions between China and the country it is engaging
in. In Zambia, the Chinese President Hu Jintao visited after the 2006 elections in an effort
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to alleviate tensions by spending a long visit in Lusaka. This was a signal from Beijing that
they wanted to continue the relationship between the two countries. The mistake China
made in doing this was they reached out to the government, but made no effort to alleviate
the concerns of the people. The relationship between the two governments had always been
good and was doubtfully going to change because of one incident. The research paper
points out, “Indeed, the 2006 election campaign showed that the government’s optimism
regarding the Chinese presence in Zambia was not shared by a significant number of
Zambians.”132 This showed the lack of the Chinese government’s ability to connect with
the stakeholders that mattered. They incorrectly identified their target audience. Horace
Wallace adds, “State-to-state relations are usually opportunistic and it is for this reason that
transnational civil society linkages between the Chinese and African people will be more
important than relations between leaders.”133

Other countries where China faces opposition
The anti-Chinese sentiment has spread to many other African countries. In fact, the
Chinese issue is poised to become the next big geo-political issue on the continent. With
many African governments willing to accept Chinese Aid, the West no longer has leverage
on the continent. These countries specifically include, South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria.
A study conducted by the Ethics Institute of South Africa found that of 1065 African from
15 different countries surveyed on a variety of issues, 43.3% had negative sentiments about
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Chinese business in Africa. 55.9% had negative sentiments about the quality of Chinese
products and services and 45.7% were negative about the economic and social
responsibility of Chinese business.134 The study adds, “Perceptions of the environmental
responsibility of Chinese business (53.9% negative), and of their employment practices
(46% negative) in Africa are bad. And labor practices are seen in a particularly poor
light.”135 The same study noted that South Africa had the most negative sentiments of all
the countries interviewed. They researchers say this is because, “Chinese companies have
been operation in South Africa for a long time and have penetrated deep into rural areas.”136
Given the depth of anti-Chinese sentiment in many African countries, it is very
probable that China will have to intervene in the politics of a foreign country in the near
future. The modified model as detailed above, to be more proactive, and less reactive, is
indeed more ideal for use in other countries.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
China’s relationship with Africa is a complicated, but nonetheless strong
relationship. The mutual dependency that has developed has fortified the relationship. The
case-study of Zambia is interesting because of the insight it provides into China’s possible
strategy in dealing with anti-China sentiment in the future. By deploying Li Baodong to
strongly rebuke Michael Sata’s, along with President Hu Jintao’s lengthy visits to the
country, China dealt with the crisis diplomatically and keeping public affairs in mind. With
the utilization of the special economic zones, China provided the economic incentive as a
second part of their mitigation strategy. Intervening in Zambia’s election by using political
threats and economic incentives was a strategy which did not help the Chinese in the long
run. The proposed models proposed an alternate decision-making paradigm which the CCP
can use to have a more successful political intervention in other countries. While antiChinese sentiments are high, it is important to note that the economic incentives are high
for the Sino-African relationship to prosper. Additionally, there are no other countries that
resemble China in terms of the lack of restrictions in aid receiving countries. In terms of
broader implications, this paper’s analysis shows that while the execution of foreign
political intervention by the CCP may be flawed, ultimately, the economics of the
relationship determine the outcome.
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